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Abstract
Smart buildings are controlled by multiple cyber-physical sys-
tems that provide critical services such as heating, ventilation,
lighting and access control. These building systems are be-
coming increasingly vulnerable to both cyber and physical at-
tacks. We introduce a multi-model methodology for assess-
ing the security of these systems, which utilises INTO-CPS, a
suite of modelling, simulation, and analysis tools for design-
ing cyber-physical systems. Using a fan coil unit case study
we show how its security can be systematically assessed when
subjected to Man-in-the-Middle attacks on the data connec-
tions between system components. We suggest our methodol-
ogy would enable building managers and security engineers to
design attack countermeasures and refine their effectiveness.
1 Introduction
Modern buildings are often labelled as ‘smart’ due to the high
level of automation incorporated into their critical systems
providing heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC),
lighting, access control, and so forth. The use of network tech-
nologies to exchange data within a single system, between dis-
parate systems, and with remote Internet-based systems means
security is becoming a considerable problem for smart build-
ings [2]. For instance, many guests were reportedly locked in-
side their rooms after the electronic door locks were disabled
in an Austrian hotel1, the heating systems of several apartment
blocks in Finland were disabled in the middle of winter after a
DDoS attack2, and up to 100 million credit card details were
stolen when a US retailer’s IT network was accessed via the
HVAC system3. Despite the rising number of reported attacks,
security mechanisms within smart buildings can often be lack-
ing. A 2016 survey conducted by the Electrical Contractors’
1 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4163886/
Alpine-hotel-brings-locks-cyber-hacking.html
2 https://boingboing.net/2016/12/02/ddos-attack-on-
finnish-automat.html
3 http://www.zdnet.com/article/anatomy-of-the-
target-data-breach-missed-opportunities-and-
lessons-learned/
Association (ECA), the Chartered Institution of Building Ser-
vices Engineers (CIBSE), and the Electrical Contractors Asso-
ciation of Scotland (SELECT) found almost 39% of building
managers don’t take any steps to protect smart building sys-
tems from cyber threats [6].
Most smart building systems can be classified as cyber-
physical systems (CPSs), comprised of software-based cyber
controllers that interact with physical sensor and actuator de-
vices. Furthermore, their inter-connection creates an Inter-
net of Things, or IoT [23], meaning a complicated cyber-
physical attack surface is presented: physical components can
be accessed and tampered with thus impacting cyber elements,
while digital controllers can be injected with fake data which
can impact physical elements. Comprehending security re-
quirements of CPSs is challenging especially where current se-
curity assessment processes are limited, coming with specific
techniques that are applicable to very narrow fields and do not
consider more holistic security considerations. In this context,
it can be difficult to assess the impact of cyber-physical attacks
and devise appropriate countermeasures [1].
One way to better understand the impact of security threats is
to model both cyber and physical elements of a building system
in a single multi-model. We therefore introduce a new multi-
modelling methodology for analysing the security of smart
buildings. Our methodology utilises INTO-CPS, an open tool
chain for model-based design of CPSs [18]. Given an initial
multi-model, the connections between constituent models that
are vulnerable to attack are identified. We then introduce pa-
rameterised adversary models, which take in data being trans-
mitted via these connections and potentially modifies it, akin
to the Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks on CPSs described
in [16]. The parameters of an adversary model correspond to
the different strategies an adversary can adopt. We then use
the Design Space Exploration (DSE) facilities of INTO-CPS
to automatically find the optimal adversary attack strategies.
The simulation results can be used to design countermeasures
against these strategies before refining their effectiveness using
our methodology in an iterative way.
More explicitly, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• A 6 step methodology to conduct security assessments of
smart building CPSs subjected to MITM attacks.
• An illustration of our methodology using a fan coil unit
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(FCU) case study.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to in-
clude systematic multi-modelling of CPSs together with se-
curity concepts, and suggest it provides the basis for more ac-
complished smart building security assessment processes.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 pro-
vides relevant background information on smart buildings and
INTO-CPS, Section 3 outlines our multi-modelling methodol-
ogy before illustrating its use by way of an FCU case study in
Section 4. Related work in Section 5, and concluding remarks
in Section 6.
2 Background
In this section we provide background information on smart
buildings and general security risks to their building systems,
before describing the INTO-CPS open tool chain for model-
based design of cyber-physical systems.
2.1 Smart buildings
2.1.1 Building systems
The Internet of Things is allowing the development of a new
class of smarter building that take advantage of automated pro-
cesses to control various aspects of the facility including heat-
ing, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC), lighting, secu-
rity and access control, and safety and mobility, among other
functions. The main motivations for this include improving op-
erational efficiency, productivity, environmental sustainability,
occupant health and safety, and reducing energy consumption.
To realise these potential advantages, modern building systems
integrate sensors to measure and collect data about the building
environment (e.g. air temperature, humidity and occupancy).
This data is transmitted to controllers which process it and, ac-
cording to rules (the control logic), send control instructions to
actuators to turn lights on or off, open or close air vents, and
change a room’s temperature, for example. This integration of
software-based cyber controllers and physical sensors and ac-
tuators devices means many building systems can be classified
as cyber-physical systems (CPSs).
Cyber and physical components typically, exchange data over
some form of communications link, be it a link localised to
a single system or a link between different systems. For ex-
ample a building system may send data to controllers of dis-
parate building systems, or to centralised building manage-
ment workstations and servers using various wired and wire-
less communication media and protocols. Internet technolo-
gies enable connection to a building’s common IT network for
central processing, visualisation and data storage, as well as
remote monitoring (e.g. outsourced facility management), and
data retrieval, (e.g. weather forecasts). The use of open com-
munication protocols, such as BACnet [3] and KNX [28], al-
low for data to be exchanged between building system compo-
nents coming from different vendors [24].
2.1.2 Security issues
Building systems present a complex cyber-physical attack sur-
face: physical components can be accessed and tampered with,
while digital controllers can be injected with fake data. Whilst
understanding both the potential cyber and physical vulnerabil-
ities is difficult, it is not as difficult as attempting to assess the
impact of a successful attack. For instance, a cyber-physical
attack could send destructive commands over the control net-
work to equipment that changes its configuration above dan-
gerous levels for which the equipment has not been designed
(e.g. too high a pressure or temperature). Understanding such
an attack requires understanding the impact on both the control
network (cyber) and the equipment (physical), and crucially,
their interconnection.
Building systems typically represent 40% of a building’s en-
ergy usage. If lighting is included, this number approaches
70%. It is therefore critical to manage energy demand cor-
rectly. However, building systems configured or operated in-
correctly are believed to account for a 20% increase in building
energy usage over correctly configured systems [27]. Cyber-
physical attacks on ‘correct’ systems could therefore increase
energy consumption and incur extra financial costs as well as
costs to operations and reputation (e.g. increased maintenance,
reduced health and safety, and lower environmental sustain-
ability). It is therefore crucial to systematically assess the im-
pact of different cyber-physical attacks on building systems by
adversaries coming with different capabilities.
2.2 INTO-CPS
INTO-CPS is an Integrated Tool chain for model-based design
of CPSs [18]. Here we outline how multi-models of CPSs
are constructed, how co-simulations are performed using those
models, and how a range of simulations can be performed us-
ing Design Space Exploration.
2.2.1 Multi-modelling
To model a CPS it is necessary to capture the behaviour of both
the cyber and physical elements, however, the nature of these
behaviours mean that they are best modelled using different
modelling notations and tools. In general, the cyber elements
are modelled using a Discrete Event (DE) notation since this
provides appropriate abstractions for describing the data struc-
tures and control flows that may be found in a cyber controller.
At the same time, the physical elements are better described in
a Continuous Time (CT) environment where behaviour is cap-
tured in the form of differential equations along with suitable
integration methods [20]. INTO-CPS makes use of the Over-
ture tool4 and the VDM-RT language [21] for DE modelling,
while 20-Sim5 and OpenModelica6 provide CT modelling en-
vironments.
4 http://overturetool.org/
5 http://www.20sim.com/
6 https://openmodelica.org/
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Modelling of a CPS starts with it being decomposed into cy-
ber and physical elements, where those elements present inter-
faces allowing them to input data from and output data to each
other. Each of these elements would then be modelled by do-
main experts, making use of the appropriate DE or CT environ-
ment. When the individual modelling activities are complete,
it is then possible to recombine the elements to form a holistic
model of the CPS. To overcome the differences between the
modelling tools, INTO-CPS expects that the individual mod-
els are exported from their modelling tool using the Functional
Mock-up Interface (FMI) standard. A model exported accord-
ing to this standard is called a Functional Mockup Unit (FMU).
An INTO-CPS multi-model of a CPS then is the combination
of a set of FMUs along with multi-model configuration file de-
tailing how to connect their inputs and outputs.
2.2.2 Co-simulation
When the multi-model is constructed it is then possible to
perform a co-simulation of the multi-model to observe the
behaviour of the CPS. INTO-CPS includes a Co-simulation
Orchestration Engine (COE) that is responsible for reading
the multi-model configuration, launching the models enclosed
in the FMUs, exchanging data between the FMUs and, im-
portantly, determining the appropriate time steps each model
should take to keep them all synchronised and stable. The user
interacts with the multi-model configuration and the COE via
the INTO-CPS application and it is in this application where
the user may define the length of the simulation, the time step-
ping method, and actually launch a co-simulation. The INTO-
CPS application also provides a live plotting facility, where the
user may choose to plot variables of the multi-model during
simulation so as to observe the modelled behaviour.
2.2.3 Design Space Exploration
It is likely that there are many choices to be made when design-
ing a CPS and these choices will affect the resulting perfor-
mance of the CPS. Choices could include physical properties
of the CPS, such as the thickness of walls in a building or the
number or placement of sensors within a room, or they could
regard cyber properties such as the choice of algorithm con-
trolling heating or the frequency at which sensors are sampled.
These choices along with the options for each define the design
space for the CPS. One use for a multi-model then is to allow
the engineer to explore the design space to find design options
that are optimised with respect to one or more performance
measures. Many of the design choices can be left open by the
domain experts that produced the original models by exposing
them as parameters of the resulting FMUs, in which case the
user has the option to make use of the DSE facilities included
in INTO-CPS to automatically explore the design space [11].
As a minimum, a DSE requires the definition of three aspects.
The first aspect, parameters, is where we describe which pa-
rameters the DSE search may change and also gives a list of
values each parameter may take. These parameters define the
design space that is to be searched.
The second and third aspects relate to how we measure per-
formance of a system and how we compare different designs
using those measures. INTO-CPS simulations produce results
in three forms, live graph plots of variables during a simula-
tion, logs of monitored variables in CSV format and also 3D
visualisations of the models if the user has created one. Since
DSE is likely to run a great many simulations it is not practical
for a user to observe all the live plots or 3D visualisations and
so DSE makes use of Objective scripts that process the CSV
simulation logs to produce objective values that characterise
the performance of a CPS during simulation. Such objective
functions might compute the total energy consumed by a sys-
tem or the maximum deviation of a variable from an acceptable
value. Once the objective values are computed for each design,
they may then be used to compare different designs. If there
is only a single performance measure than results may simply
be placed in an list, ordered by that measure, to find the best,
however, if there are multiple measures then a different means
for comparison must be used. In the latter case, INTO-CPS
makes uses the Pareto method to present the user with a non-
dominated set of best designs [9].
3 Multi-modelling methodology
In this section we introduce our multi-modelling methodology
by first giving an overview of its six steps before describing
each of those steps in more detail. We present this methodol-
ogy from the viewpoint of a security engineer, and we there-
fore assume that a multi-model for the CPS already exists (see
above), albeit with no security specific elements. In a nutshell,
the six steps are:
1. Identify data connections between constituent models.
2. Create an adversary model for each type of connection.
3. Identify relevant security metrics.
4. Design model for missing metrics.
5. Run DSE to identify optimal attacks.
6. Propose and design counter measures.
3.1 Identify data connections
The connections in a multi-model represent exchanges of data
between constituent models, but not all of those exchanges rep-
resent connections that are vulnerable to MITM attacks. The
first step in the methodology is therefore to establish which
connections are potentially vulnerable. This identification re-
lies on the nature of the connection and also any implemen-
tation details. For instance if the connection represents com-
munications between a sensor and a controller then this con-
nection might be vulnerable depending on whether encryp-
tion is used and if an attacker could have a physical access.
However, a connection representing energy transfer between a
wall model and the outside environment model could not be
attacked in this way.
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3.2 Create adversary model
Given a data connection, the next step is to define an adver-
sary model for that connection, i.e., to make explicit how an
attacker can change the data exchanged over the connection.
As suggested in Section 1, many physical and cyber attacks
may be possible on a CPS, possibly coming with different pa-
rameters and interfaces. In the most general case, the attacker
could potentially change a value on a connection in any way
they like. However, in practice, we might want to encode the
actual supposed qualities of the attacker. For instance, an at-
tacker might only be able to send fake data, without blocking
the real data, or an attacker might only be able to change en-
vironmental data by physically changing the environment (e.g.
putting a heat source by a temperature sensor).
3.3 Identify relevant metrics
In general, security metrics might be different from the func-
tional metrics used for the design of the multi-model. The se-
lection of metrics for the DSE step (see below) therefore de-
pends on the characterisation of the expected impact of attacks
on the system: financial cost by increasing energy consump-
tion, denial of service, loss of information, etc. Irrelevant met-
rics can be removed, since DSE can be computationally expen-
sive, while missing metrics need to be designed.
3.4 Design for missing metrics
It is possible that the original multi-model was not designed
to output metrics that are required by the security analysis, in
which case it will be necessary to either modify one of the ex-
isting constituent models or add a new model. For example,
suppose we want to measure the wear on a CPS component,
since the attack we wish to simulate attempts to maximise the
components usage. The original model does not consider com-
ponent usage, so this metric is therefore added.
3.5 Run Design Space Exploration
With the model modified to support the security analysis, we
can now run a DSE to elicit the ‘optimal’ attacker, where op-
timal might be determined using antagonistic metrics. For ex-
ample the adversary might want to maximise a specific security
metric (e.g. maximum usage), while minimising likelihood of
the attack being detected. The DSE generates a set of ranked
Pareto curves where rank 1 is the set of ‘best’ adversary mod-
els in respect to simulation objectives and the lowest rank is
the set of ‘worst’ adversaries.
3.6 Propose countermeasures
Having analysed results of a DSE, it may be desirable to imple-
ment countermeasures to remove, or at the very least, alleviate
the impact of a MITM attack. Countermeasures may involve
simply tweaking existing CPS operational settings; running a
DSE to find the optimum from a range of possible operational
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Fig. 1: Overview of fan coil unit (FCU) example.
settings is one method. Alternatively, it may be necessary to
design new countermeasures and implement them within one
or more constituent models of the CPS. Introducing counter-
measures can mitigate an attack but also negatively impact the
operation of a CPS. By employing our methodology in an iter-
ative way, a countermeasure, or a set of countermeasures, can
be continually refined and tested to find a satisfactory compro-
mise between the security of a CPS and its operational effec-
tiveness.
4 Fan coil unit case study
In this section we illustrate our methodology with a fan coil
unit (FCU) case study. We describe an FCU, a multi-model of
the FCU created using INTO-CPS, and show a co-simulation
of the FCU’s normal operation. We then consider a MITM
attack which aims to expedite wear on the FCU, and use our
methodology to assess the security of the FCU under this at-
tack.
4.1 Fan coil unit
Figure 1 provides an abstracted overview of an FCU example
taken from [10]. The FCU contains a fan that draws air into the
unit then blows it over a cooling/heating coil. The air comes
out of the FCU, either heated or cooled depending on the coil
temperature, and enters a room. Water flows into the coil from
a heat pump which is reversible, and can work in either di-
rection to either heat or cool the water supply. A water flow
value controls the rate of water flow from the heat pump to the
coil, thus controlling the temperature change rate of the coil.
A cyber controller is able to alter both the fan speed and the
water flow value. Each FCU is provided with a small outside
air supply to ensure adequate ventilation, which is mixed in the
outside air mixing damper with air recirculated from the room.
Any excess recirculated air leaves the system via the exhaust.
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Fig. 2: Multi-model of the fan coil unit (FCU) example.
In addition, the room temperature is affected by the outside
air temperature, the thermal conductivity of the room’s walls
and windows, and the room air temperature set-point. We as-
sume the latter is set to 21◦c by default during any working day
which can be altered by room occupants by +/- 3◦C in 0.5◦c in-
crements. These elements together constitute the environment
of the FCU.
4.1.1 Fan coil unit multi-model
Figure 2 shows a multi-model of an FCU with 3 con-
stituent models: Environment, RoomHeating, and
Controller. The Environment and RoomHeating
are continuous time models, created in 20-Sim, representing
physical elements of the FCU . The RoomHeating model
is comprised of two sub-models: Wall and Room. The
Controller represents the cyber element of the FCU and
is a discrete event model encoded in VDM-RT. All three con-
stituent models are exported as FMUs which are connected us-
ing the INTO-CPS application to create an FCU multi-model.
The Environment model encapsulates the room air temper-
ature set-point (RATSP) and the outside air temperature (OAT).
The RATSP and OAT are communicated to the Controller
and Wall models respectively. The Controller model in-
puts the RATSP and the current room air temperature (RAT)
and outputs settings for the fan and water flow value labelled
as fan speed (FS) and valve open (VO). The Wall model in-
puts the OAT and RAT and outputs the wall surface tempera-
ture (WST) to the Room model. The Room model inputs the
WST, FS, and VO and outputs the RAT.
4.1.2 Fan coil unit co-simulation
Figure 3 shows a slice of the results of running a simulation of
the FCU. The RAT (dark red line) starts at 15◦C, and begins
to rise around time = 510 when the RATSP (orange line) is
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Fig. 3: Co-simulation snippet between 500 and 600 minutes of
FCU’s normal operation.
21◦C and the controller increases FS (green line). When RAT
reaches RATSP, FS reduces and then varies to maintain the
desired air temperature. The wear on the FCU, represented by
the fan usage (light red line), is also shown. Note that fan usage
increases more rapidly at higher fan speeds.
4.2 Fan coil unit security analysis
We now illustrate how our methodology is used to assess the
security of the FCU being subjected to a MITM attack aiming
to maximise wear on the FCU, driving up energy and mainte-
nance costs as a result.
4.2.1 Identify data connections
Given the multi-model illustrated in Figure 2, the first step
is to identify connections that are potentially vulnerable to
MITM attacks. Four such connections are identified in
this case: Environment → Controller transmitting
RATSP, Room → Controller transmitting RAT, and two
Controller→ Room connections transmitting FS and VO
respectively. For simplicity, we assume these data connections
are unencrypted. All remaining connections involve physical
data (i.e. energy) transfer and are not susceptible to a MITM
attack.
4.2.2 Create adversary model
For illustration purposes we consider a MITM attack on a sin-
gle data connection; a more complex attack is considered in
Section 4.3. Gaining control of the connection between the
Environment and Controller enables an adversary to
intercept, and potentially modify, the RATSP being transmit-
ted. We assume the adversary’s objective is to expedite the
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Algorithm 1 Adversary model function attack executed at
frequency fa.
1: RATSPin ← 0
2: RATSP∗ ← 0
3: function ATTACK(⊥t,>t)
4: RATSPin = input(RATSP)
5: if RATSPin > 0 then
6: if RATSP∗ < RATSPin then
7: RATSP∗ ← RATSPin + >t
8: else
9: RATSP∗ ← RATSPin - ⊥t
10: end if
11: else
12: RATSP∗ ← 0
13: end if
14: output(RATSP∗)
15: end function
wear on the FCU by maximising fan usage, thus increasing
costs from energy requirements, maintenance demands, etc.
By continually increasing and decreasing the RATSP at a given
frequency, the adversary can force the FCU’s fan to oscil-
late, that is, switch on and off. We therefore consider a pa-
rameterised DE adversary modelM which can launch attack
strategies of the form (fa,>t,⊥t), where fa is the frequency
at which RATSP should be modified, >t is the temperature
increase to RATSP, and ⊥t the temperature decrease. Algo-
rithm 1 provides the attack function encoded inM, which is
executed at frequency fa. Note, RATSP is only modified if
RATSP > 0.
To connect adversary model M to the FCU multi-model, its
interface is implemented allowing it to input and output the
RATSP data type. Figure 47 shows howM is placed between
the Environment and Controller of the original FCU
multi-model to prime the MITM attack. The interfaces of these
two constituent models are not modified. The connection be-
tweenM and Controller is labelled RATSP∗, whose value
may or may not be equal to RATSP.
4.2.3 Identify relevant metrics
As the MITM attack we are modelling withM involves mod-
ifying RATSP, which in turn impacts FS, clearly both of these
metrics are relevant and remain in the model. The metrics
OAT and WST are also necessary as they influence the RAT
which, together with the RATSP, impacts FS and VO set by
Controller. An energy metric E has been implemented
by domain experts in Controller. We consider a more
generic metric for wear on the FCU in terms of fan usage in
Section 4.2.4 which comes with minimal computational over-
head and therefore remove E from the multi-model.
7 The dotted connections can be disregarded at this stage.
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Fig. 4: Multi-model of FCU with AdversaryM intercept-
ing RATSP, and M∗ intercepting both RATSP and
RAT.
4.2.4 Design for missing metrics
We add a metric FU to Controller denoting the running
total of FCU fan usage during a given period of operation. For
illustration purposes it is enough to consider this simple met-
ric to indicate the wear on the FCU when subjected to differ-
ent MITM attacks. It can also indicate how much the fan’s
usage can be reduced without impacting operational require-
ments when introducing attack countermeasures. The FU met-
ric encapsulates many different concepts including wear, en-
ergy use, maintenance demands, etc. Each concept could be
represented by separate metrics but with increased computa-
tional overheads.
The FU metric is designed as follows: if the fan is switched
on, that is if FS = 0 at simulation time step i and FS > 0 at
simulation time step i+1, then a ‘switch on’ penalty of +0.5 is
incurred. The following ‘usage costs’ are also incurred at each
simulation time step i depending on the FS at time step i.
fan speed (FS) usage cost
0 < FS ≤ 5 +0.05
5 < FS ≤ 10 +0.10
10 < FS ≤ 15 +0.30
15 < FS +0.50
We have selected arbitrary usage costs which increase as FS
increases. Note, the maximum value for FS is 20.
4.2.5 Run design space exploration
In the DSE configuration file, two objectives are stated for each
simulation: compute the total fan usage, and compute the av-
erage temperature deviation of the RAT from the RATSP. We
write µf and σt respectively to denote the values these two ob-
jectives. The reason for computing µf is straightforward as the
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Fig. 5: Co-simulation snippet of MITM attack strategy α1 us-
ing adversary model M, where fa = 1, >t = 3 and
⊥t = 1.5.
aim of the adversary is to maximise fan usage. Average tem-
perature deviation is also chosen as we assume an adversary
wants to avoid detection, that is by minimising the violation to
user comfort over the simulation period.
We write Xj for the result set of all steps in the simulation
of attack strategy αj . With INTO-CPS, the result set Xj is
outputted as a .csv file. For each simulation time step i, the
result xi ∈ Xj is a tuple indicating the values of FCU metrics
at time step i, denoted as (FUi,RATi,RATSPi,OATi). Trivially,
as FU never decreases, total fan usage is equivalent to FU of
the final simulation time step, that is µf = FU|Xj |. Total fan
usage is computed automatically by INTO-CPS by using the
objectiveType ‘Max’ function together with the .csv
file column ID ‘FU’ within the DSE configuration file.
To compute the average temperature deviation of attack strat-
egy αj , we first discount any xi ∈ Xj where RATSPi = 0.
This gives result set Rj ⊆ Xj , where Rj = {xi ∈ Xj |
RATSPi 6= 0}. The average temperature deviation σt for αj is
then given by:
√∑|Rj |
i=1 (RATi − RATSPi)2
|Rj |
The average temperature deviation is computed automatically
by INTO-CPS by encoding the above calculation into an im-
ported user metric script.
For each attack strategy simulation, the start and end times
are set to the equivalent of 500 minutes and 1050 minutes in
actual time. This approximates to one working day, that is,
8.30am to 5.30pm. A much longer simulation period could
be implemented, say over a week or month, but it is enough
to illustrate our approach to simulate the FCU operating over
a single working day. Simulation time step size is set to 1
minute such that 550 results are generated per simulation, that
is |Xs| = 550.
Figure 5 shows a simulation snippet between 500 and 600 min-
utes of a single attack strategy α1, where fa = 1 (minute),
>t = 3 (◦C), and ⊥t = 1.5 (◦C). Comparing this plot to Fig-
ure 3 where the FCU is operating normally, it is clear to see
how the attack strategy increases the FCU usage by making
the fan speed oscillate. After 600 minutes of normal operation,
FU ≈ 13, whereas when being attacked, FU ≈ 38, more than
double in the same period.
In the DSE configuration file, the parameter ranges for adver-
sary modelM are as follows:
• fa : [0.25,0.50,0.75,1.00,1.25,1.50,1.75,2.00]
• >t : [0.0,0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0,2.5,3.0]
• ⊥t : [0.0,0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0,2.5,3.0]
Taking all parameter combinations into account, the DSE com-
prises of running 392 simulations and outputting the subse-
quent result sets.
The DSE simulations are ranked to generate a Pareto front
whose points maximise fan usage (objective 1) and minimise
temperature deviation (objective 2). The Pareto front produced
by the DSE is shown in Figure 6 (red line) and whose endpoints
are given in Table 1. The Pareto front end points are essentially
the two optimal attack strategies denoted as α1 and α2. Attack
strategy α1 satisfies objective 1 by maximising the total fan
usage (µfan = 153.20), but not objective 2; the average tem-
perature deviation is also maximised (σtemp = 2.83). Alter-
natively, attack strategy α2 satisfies objective 2 by minimising
the average temperature deviation (σtemp = 0.68), but not ob-
jective 1; the total fan usage is also minimised (µfan = 23.50).
The Pareto front effectively offers the optimal trade-offs be-
tween maximising fan usage and minimising average tempera-
ture deviation. An adversary wanting to incur maximum FCU
usage in the shortest time, and with little concern for detection,
would arguably use an attack strategy on the Pareto front close
to α1. On the other hand, an adversary willing to ‘play the
long game’ and incur maximum FCU usage with a low risk of
detection, would arguably use an attack strategy on the Pareto
front close to α2.
Interestingly, as seen in Figure 6 the attack can generate a total
fan usage µf ≈ 100 while the average temperature deviation
σt is kept below 1. The optimal attack strategy for this, α =
(0.75, 0.5, 0.5) results in µf = 101.85 and σt = 0.813. In
order to increase µf any attack strategy will increase σt, such
that 2 / σt / 3.
A special case must be noted, that is, for this particular MITM
attack to have any impact on FCU fan usage, RAT must be less
than RATSP when RATSP> 0. Clearly, if RAT> RATSP> 0
then it is unnecessary for the FCU fan to switch on in order to
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Fig. 6: DSE Pareto fronts illustrating adversaryM optimal at-
tacks with and without countermeasure.
raise RAT towards the RATSP. If this condition holds for the
duration of the attack, the attack can be considered a failure as
no fan usage will have been incurred. A more complex MITM
attack could force the FCU’s fan to oscillate continually, even
when fan operation is not required.
4.2.6 Propose countermeasures
Having observed the DSE results presented in Section 4.2.5
it may be desirable to implement countermeasures to allevi-
ate the impact of the MITM attack. For illustration purposes
we consider decreasing the frequency, in which Controller
polls the incoming data connection for the current RATSP.
More precisely, the countermeasure reduces Controller
polling frequency from 1 to 2 minutes.
Figure 7 shows a co-simulation snippet between 500 and 660
minutes of attack strategy α1 = (1, 3, 1.5) on the FCU with
the implemented Controller frequency countermeasure.
Comparing this plot to Figure 5 where no countermeasure is
implemented, it is clear to see how the countermeasure has de-
creased fan usage. The Pareto front produced by the DSE is
shown in Figure 6 (blue line), whose endpoints are given in
Table 1, denoted as attack strategies α3 and α4.
Positively, the countermeasure reduces the maximal total fan
α µf σt fa >t ⊥t
Attack α1 153.20 2.83 1.00 3.00 1.50
α2 23.50 0.68 2.00 0.00 0.50
Countered α3 78.05 2.85 2.00 3.00 3.00
α4 13.20 0.72 1.50 0.00 0.50
Table 1: Pareto front endpoints from DSE indicating optimal
attacks and optimal countered attacks on fan coil unit.
500 550 600 650
0
5
10
15
20
Time (minutes)
Te
m
p.
(◦
C
)/
Fa
n
Sp
ee
d/
Fa
n
U
sa
ge
Outside Air Temp. Fan Speed
Room Air Temp. Set-Point Fan Usage
Room Air Temp.
Fig. 7: Co-simulation snippet of MITM attack strategy α1 us-
ing adversary model M, where fa = 1, >t = 3 and
⊥t = 1.5, and FCU Controller frequency counter-
measure.
usage µf caused by the attack (using α3) by almost half, and
fractionally increases the minimal average temperature devia-
tion σt (using α4), thus increasing the chance of attack detec-
tion. Negatively, the countermeasure in some cases can prevent
the FCU from raising the RAT to the required RATSP as seen
in Figure 7; RAT only reaches a maximum of 20◦C before be-
ginning to fall. This would imply a trade-off must be sought
between FCU operation and security.
4.3 More complex models
So far we have consider a MITM attack on a single data con-
nection. We now give a glimpse of how our methodology can
be used to analyse more sophisticated adversary models. Fig-
ure 4 shows how adversary M is extended to intercept both
RATSP and RAT (dotted arrow) to form adversaryM∗. With
this attack scenario,M∗ monitors RAT to decide when to mod-
ify the RATSP; in this case whenever RAT < RATSP + 1.
It is assumed the risk of detection is too great for the adver-
sary when the RAT moves above this point. Figure 8 shows a
co-simulation snippet between 500 and 660 minutes of attack
strategy α1 = (1, 3, 1.5) on the FCU under adversary M∗.
Note how the attack causes the fan speed to oscillate only when
RAT is below 22◦C.
5 Related Work
Many model-based tools focus on single formalisms [4], which
can be a barrier to modelling heterogeneous systems where
diverse models from multiple sources would be more appro-
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Fig. 8: Co-simulation snippet of MITM attack strategy α1 us-
ing adversary modelM∗, where fa = 1, >t = 3 and
⊥t = 1.5.
priate [5]. Connecting and analysing models through co-
simulation is a promising alternative to single-formalism ap-
proaches, with a large variety of approaches currently being
researched [13]. Bespoke solutions for co-simulation of infras-
tructure models have been demonstrated [22, 12, 17], includ-
ing those using network simulators to mimic real communica-
tions [14]. The INTO-CPS approach is to provide a general
co-simulation framework based on an open protocol, which
seeks to avoid vendor lock-in and provides protection for in-
tellectual property by supporting ‘black box’ models [19]. The
INTO-CPS approach has been successfully applied in a num-
ber of industry settings, by companies outside of the original
project, in areas including marine propulsion [26], autonomous
planetary rovers [7], and manufacturing [25].
Given the aforementioned challenges in understanding the vul-
nerabilities and impact of breaches in complex CPSs such as
those in modern buildings, it is important to use appropri-
ate techniques to assist in security assessments. Examples
of methodologies for security assessment in industrial control
system settings include [15]. This approach is based upon an
introductory presentation on security assessments (an integral
part of the methodology since the methodology is designed for
non-experts as well as experts); a security assessment form;
and mind maps used to provide a visual presentation of any
issues identified. It is argued that this approach gives much
broader results (such as recommendations for audit logging)
than a penetration test, and, in contrast to threat modelling,
requires the assessor to include possible mitigation strategies.
However, without the involvement of security professionals,
the effectiveness of the results could be limited. The approach
to physical security in the methodology is restricted to unau-
thorised access, rather than a more holistic security considera-
tion.
In contrast to the work in [15], the work presented in [29]
(which features two authors in common with the former paper)
is designed to be used by security professionals. The authors
present a threat modelling methodology that aims to address
the issue that many techniques are specific and only applicable
in very narrow fields, or generic and fail to generate data that
is useful for automated processing.
More recent work has seen the development of a hybrid,
distributed simulation platform for cyber-security analysis of
large-scale critical infrastructure systems, [8]. The authors in-
tegrate simulated, emulated and real systems upon which vul-
nerability analysis could be performed.
6 Conclusion
This paper presents the first multi-modelling methodology for
capturing and analysing Man-in-the-Middle attacks against
cyber-physical systems (CPSs), illustrated on a fan coil unit
in a smart building. Our approach particularly enables the de-
sign of an optimal attacker, and the modelling and assessment
of appropriate countermeasures.
We pave the way for an exciting range of CPS security mod-
elling, and several strands of future works are possible. Firstly,
we can increase the complexity of the multi-model (e.g. attack
on heating system of a data centre, for which the controller is
arguably more complex), as well as the complexity of the ad-
versary (e.g. attacks distributed over several components with
causal failure, modelling of real world communication proto-
cols using INTO-CPS Ether, possibly including encryption).
The future development of the INTO-CPS tool chain will also
improve the depth of the security assessment. In addition to
the INTO-CPS Ether, mentioned above, the notion of scenario
sweeping in INTO-CPS DSE will enable to change aspects of
the simulation, such as the outside air temperature profile or the
user temperature set-point profile, such that the attack and mit-
igation may be examined under a variety of conditions rather
than just one. Finally, we plan to apply our approach on exist-
ing and deployed CPS, such as those provided with Newcastle
University’s Urban Sciences Building and the many building
systems within it to explore and assess.
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